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the Question of Ottoman Decline in Harvard Middle East and Islamic Review

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Historical narrative

In 1683 the Ottoman Empire reached its maximum territorial extent in Europe, during the period formerly labelled equally i of stagnation and decline.

The Ottoman Decline Thesis or Ottoman Decline Paradigm (Turkish: Osmanlı Gerileme Tezi) is an obsolete[ane] historical narrative which one time played a dominant function in the written report of the history of the Ottoman Empire. According to the decline thesis, following a gold age associated with the reign of Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent (r. 1520–1566), the empire gradually entered into a menstruum of extensive stagnation and pass up from which it was never able to recover, lasting until the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire in 1923.[2] This thesis was used throughout near of the twentieth century as the basis of both Western and Republican Turkish[3] understanding of Ottoman history. All the same, by 1978, historians had begun to reexamine the key assumptions of the refuse thesis.[iv]

After the publication of numerous new studies throughout the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s, and the reexamination of Ottoman history through the use of previously untapped sources and methodologies, academic historians of the Ottoman Empire accomplished a consensus that the entire notion of Ottoman reject was a myth – that in fact, the Ottoman Empire did not stagnate or decline at all, but rather connected to exist a vigorous and dynamic land long after the expiry of Suleiman the Magnificent.[one] The refuse thesis has been criticized every bit "teleological", "regressive", "Orientalist", "simplistic", and "one-dimensional",[5] and described as "a concept which has no place in historical assay".[6] Scholars have thus "learned amend than to talk over [information technology]."[seven]

Despite this dramatic image shift amidst professional person historians, the decline thesis continues to maintain a potent presence in popular history, besides equally academic history written by scholars who are not specialists on the Ottoman Empire. In some cases this is due to the continued reliance by non-specialists on outdated and debunked works,[8] and in others to certain political interests benefiting from the connected perpetuation of the refuse narrative.[9]

Origins of the reject thesis [edit]

In the Ottoman Empire [edit]

The first attributions of turn down to the Ottoman country came from Ottoman intellectuals themselves.[x] Beginning much before, but greatly expanding during the seventeenth century, was the literary genre of nasihatname, or "Advice for Kings."[11] This genre had a long history, appearing in earlier Muslim empires such as those of the Seljuks and Abbasids. Nasihatname literature was primarily concerned with gild and disorder in land and society; it conceptualized the ruler equally the embodiment of justice, whose duty information technology was to ensure that his subjects would receive that justice. This was often expressed through the concept of the Circle of Justice (Ottoman Turkish: dāʾire-i ʿadlīye). In this conception, the provision of justice by the ruler to his subjects would allow those subjects to prosper, strengthening the ruler in turn.[12] Should this break down, club would cease to properly function.

Thus, many Ottomans writing in this genre, such as Mustafa Âlî,[13] described the reign of Suleiman I every bit the almost perfect manifestation of this arrangement of justice, and put forth the idea that the empire had since declined from that gilded standard. These writers viewed the changes which the empire had undergone equally an inherently negative corruption of an arcadian Suleimanic past. Yet, it is now recognized that rather than simply describing objective reality, they were oftentimes utilizing the genre of decline to voice their ain personal complaints. For example, Mustafa Âli's belief that the empire was declining was in large function motivated by frustration at his own failure to achieve promotions and court patronage.[14] The primary goal of the nasihatname writers, so, may have merely been to protect their own personal or class condition in a rapidly irresolute world.[15] [sixteen]

In Western Europe [edit]

One of the first reference of Ottoman reject in Western historiography tin can be found in Incrementa atque decrementa aulae othomanicae completed in 1717 by Dimitrie Cantemir[17] and translated in English in 1734.[eighteen] He was followed in the nineteenth century, amongst others, by Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall,[19] who knew Ottoman Turkish and adopted the idea directly from Ottoman nasihatname writers. Internal decline was thus thought of every bit an appropriate ways of explaining the Ottomans' external military machine defeats, and acted besides as a justification for European imperialism.[20] The notion of a failing Ottoman/Islamic civilization was thus used as a foil for Western Civilisation, in which the "decadent" Ottomans were contrasted with the "dynamic" Westward. Islam (as an extensive civilizational category) often came to be portrayed every bit the polar opposite of the West, whereby Western societies valued freedom, rationality, and progress while Islam valued servility, superstition, and stagnation.[21] Such depictions were perpetuated in the mid-twentieth century above all by the works of H.A.R. Gibb and Harold Bowen, and Bernard Lewis, who adhered to a civilizational conception of Islamic refuse while modifying it with the new sociological paradigm of Modernization Theory.[22] These views came under increasing criticism equally historians began to reexamine their own cardinal assumptions about Ottoman and Islamic history, particularly later the publication of Edward Said'due south Orientalism in 1978.[23]

Tenets [edit]

Bernard Lewis was 1 of the turn down thesis' most famous proponents.

The virtually prominent writer on Ottoman decline was the historian Bernard Lewis,[24] who argued that the Ottoman Empire experienced all-encompassing refuse affecting government, society and civilization. He laid out his views in the 1958 article, "Some Reflections on the Decline of the Ottoman Empire",[25] which developed into the mainstream opinion of Orientalist scholars of the mid-twentieth century. Even so, the article is now highly criticized and no longer considered authentic by modern historians.[26] Lewis' views were every bit follows:

The start ten sultans of the Ottoman Empire (from Osman I to Suleiman the Magnificent) were of splendid personal quality, while those who came after Suleiman were without exception "incompetents, degenerates, and misfits," a result of the Kafes organization of succession, whereby dynastic princes no longer gained feel in provincial regime before coming to the throne. Faulty leadership at the height led to disuse in all branches of government: the bureaucracy ceased to function finer, and the quality of their records worsened. The Ottoman military lost its strength and began to experience defeats on the battleground. They ceased to keep up with the advances of European military science, and consequently suffered territorial losses. As the Ottoman state and lodge was geared towards constant expansion, their sudden failure to achieve new conquests left the empire unable to conform to its new relationship with Europe.

Economically, the empire was undermined past the discovery of the New Earth and the subsequent shift in the economic balance betwixt the Mediterranean and Atlantic Europe, as well as the voyages of discovery which brought Europeans to Republic of india, and led to a decline in the book of trade passing through Ottoman ports. In addition, the Toll Revolution led to the destabilization of Ottoman coinage and a severe financial crisis, which proved disastrous when paired with the rapidly rising costs of warfare. Equally the cavalry army of the Ottomans became obsolete, the Timar System of country tenure which had sustained information technology cruel into obsolescence, while the corrupt bureaucracy was unable to replace it with a functional culling. Instead, revenue enhancement-farming was introduced, leading to corruption and oppression of the peasantry, and agricultural decline. Ottoman economical and military backwardness was extenuated by their airtight-mindedness and unwillingness to prefer European innovations, as well every bit an increasing disdain for practical science. Ultimately, the Ottoman Empire "reverted to a medieval country, with a medieval mentality and a medieval economic system – simply with the added burden of a bureaucracy and a continuing army which no medieval land had ever had to bear."[27]

Significantly, explanations of Ottoman refuse were not express to the empire'southward geopolitical position among world empires or to its armed services strength. The decline thesis was rooted in the nineteenth- and early twentieth-century conception of distinct "civilizations" as units of historical analysis, and thus explained Ottoman weakness with reference non only to its geopolitics but also defined information technology in social, economic, cultural, and moral terms. This all-encompassing notion of the turn down of Ottoman (and more than widely, Islamic) culture became the framework within which Ottoman history from the sixteenth century onward was understood.[28]

Criticism of the thesis [edit]

Conceptual problems [edit]

Dana Sajdi, in an commodity summarizing the critiques of the pass up thesis written since the 1970s, identifies the post-obit as the main points that scholars take demonstrated: "1. The changing nature and adaptability of Ottoman state and order; 2. indigenous or internal social, economic, and/or intellectual processes displaying signs of modernity prior to the advent of the West; 3. the comparability of Ottoman state and society with their counterparts in the world in the aforementioned menstruation; and 4. a logic, or a framework, alternative to decline and the Eurocentrism implied therein, that takes into account the phenomena of the seventeenth to eighteenth centuries."[29] The first two points pertain to the reject thesis' depiction of Ottoman state and society every bit existence backward-looking, static, and essentially incapable of innovation prior to the 'bear upon of the West'; the tertiary concerns the degree to which the Ottoman Empire was taken to exist totally unique, operating co-ordinate to its own rules and internal logic, rather than beingness integrated into a wider comparative framework of earth history; while the fourth addresses the degree to which the decline thesis overlooked the local processes really occurring in the Ottoman Empire during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, in favor of emphasis on the grand narrative of Ottoman decay and European superiority.[30]

In line with these points, a common criticism of the reject thesis is that it is teleological: that is to say that information technology presents all of Ottoman history as the story of the ascent and fall of the empire, causing before historians to over-emphasize the empire'due south troubles and under-emphasize its strengths. According to Linda Darling, "because we know that eventually the Ottomans became a weaker power and finally disappeared, every before difficulty they experienced becomes a "seed of decline," and Ottoman successes and sources of strength vanish from the record."[31] The corollary of decline is the notion that the empire had before reached a pinnacle, and this too has been problematized. The reign of Suleiman the Magnificent had been seen equally a golden age to which all of the rest of the empire's history was to be compared. Such comparisons caused earlier researchers to see transformation and change every bit inherently negative, as the empire shifted away from the established norms of Suleiman's romanticized and arcadian age. According to Jane Hathaway, this focus on the "golden age" had a distorting result on its history: "a massive empire that lasted for over six centuries cannot have had an ideal moment and an ideal permutation by which the unabridged chronological and geographical span of the empire tin can be judged."[32] Instead, modern scholars take change to be a natural issue of the empire's accommodation to the earth around it, a sign of innovativeness and flexibility rather than pass up.[33]

Political [edit]

In reexamining the notion of political decline in the Ottoman Empire, historians offset examined the nasihatname texts which had formed the backbone of the decline thesis. Many scholars, amid them nearly notably Douglas Howard[34] and Rifa'at Ali Abou-El-Haj,[35] pointed out that these Ottoman writers' critiques of contemporary society were not uninfluenced by their own biases, and criticized earlier historians for taking them at face up value without whatever critical analysis. Furthermore, "complaint nigh the times" was in fact a literary trope in Ottoman gild, and also existed during the period of the so-called "gilt age" of Suleiman the Magnificent.[36] For Ottoman writers, "decline" was a trope which allowed them to pass judgement on the contemporary state and society, rather than a clarification of objective reality. Thus, these works should not be taken every bit evidence of bodily Ottoman decline.[37] [38]

Other tropes of political turn down, such as the notion that the sultans ruling later the time of Suleiman I were less competent rulers, have as well been challenged.[39] The reigns of such figures equally Ahmed I,[twoscore] Osman Ii,[41] and Mehmed Iv[42] (among others) take been re-examined in the context of the conditions of their own respective eras, rather than past inappropriately comparing them with a mythical Suleimanic ideal.[32] Indeed, the very notion of whether Suleiman's reign constituted a golden age in the first place has come into question.[43] [44] The fact that sultans no longer personally accompanied the regular army on armed forces campaigns is no longer criticized, but seen as a positive and necessary change resulting from the empire's transformation into a sedentary imperial polity.[45] Leslie Peirce's research on the political role of women in the Ottoman dynasty has demonstrated the inaccuracy of the assumption that the and then-called Sultanate of Women, in which female members of the dynasty exercised an unusually high caste of power, was in some way either a cause or a symptom of majestic weakness. On the contrary, Ottoman Valide Sultans, princesses, and concubines were successfully able to fortify dynastic dominion during periods of instability, and played an important part in dynastic legitimization.[46] Furthermore, the importance of the apace expanding bureaucracy is now particularly emphasized every bit a source of stability and strength for the empire during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, drawing particularly upon the piece of work of Linda Darling.[47] [48] Based largely on the work of Ariel Salzmann, the empowerment of regional notables in the eighteenth century has been reinterpreted equally an effective form of regime, rather than a sign of decline.[49] [50]

Military [edit]

One of the most indelible claims of the refuse thesis was that of the weakness of the Ottoman military in the post-Suleimanic period. Supposedly, the in one case-feared Janissary Corps became corrupted as they increasingly earned privileges for themselves, gaining the right to marry, sire children, and enroll those children into the corps. Rather than maintaining strict war machine discipline, they began to take upwardly professions as merchants and shopkeepers in guild to supplement their income, thus losing their military machine edge. However, it is at present understood that janissary participation in the economy was not express to the mail service-Suleimanic period. Janissaries were engaging in commerce as early as the fifteenth century, without whatever apparent impact on their military discipline.[51] Furthermore, far from becoming militarily ineffective, the Janissaries continued to remain one of the nigh innovative forces in Europe, introducing the tactic of volley fire alongside and perhaps even earlier than most European armies.[52]

Even greater attending has been given to the changes experienced by the Timar Organization during this era. The breakdown of the Timar System is now seen non as a outcome of incompetent administration, merely equally a witting policy meant to help the empire arrange to the increasingly monetized economic system of the late sixteenth century. Thus, far from beingness a symptom of decline, this was part of a process of military and fiscal modernization.[53] [54] [55] The army of cavalry which the Timar System had produced was becoming increasingly obsolete by the seventeenth century, and this transformation allowed the Ottomans to instead enhance large armies of musket-wielding infantry, thereby maintaining their armed services competitiveness.[56] By the 1690s, the proportion of infantry in the Ottoman army had increased to 50–60 percent, equivalent to their Habsburg rivals.[57]

In terms of armament production and weapons technology, the Ottomans remained roughly equivalent with their European rivals throughout most of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.[58] [59] The theory that Ottoman cannon foundries neglected mobile field guns past producing oversized siege cannon at a disproportionate rate has been debunked by the military historian Gábor Ágoston.[sixty] Despite the Orientalistic merits that an inherent conservatism in Islam prevented the Ottomans from adopting European military machine innovations, information technology is now known that the Ottomans were receptive to foreign techniques and inventions, and connected to employ European renegades and technical experts throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.[61] [62] In terms of productive chapters, the Ottomans were even able to surpass their European rivals during the seventeenth century. They maintained total cocky-sufficiency in gunpowder production until the tardily eighteenth century, and with rare and brief exceptions were continually able to produce enough cannon and muskets to supply their whole armed forces too as surplus stockpiles.[63] According to Gábor Ágoston and Rhoads Murphey, Ottoman defeats in the 1683–99 and 1768–74 wars with the Habsburgs and Russia are best explained past the strain on logistics and communications caused by multi-front end warfare rather than Ottoman inferiority in engineering and armaments, as such inferiority, insofar as it existed at all, was far less significant than had formerly been believed.[64] [65] It is now believed that the Ottoman armed services was able to maintain rough parity with its rivals until the 1760s, falling backside as a issue of a long period of peace on its western forepart between 1740 and 1768, when the Ottomans missed out on the advances associated with the Seven Years' State of war.[66]

Economical and fiscal [edit]

Early critiques of the decline thesis from an economic standpoint were heavily influenced by new sociological perspectives of dependency theory and earth-systems assay as articulated by scholars such every bit Andre Gunder Frank and Immanuel Wallerstein in the 1960s and 1970s. These theories provided an influential critique of the prevailing theory of modernization which was then popular among economists and political analysts, and had been the framework within which Ottoman economic history had been understood, exemplified to a higher place all by Bernard Lewis' 1961 The Emergence of Modern Turkey. Modernization theory held that the underdeveloped world was impoverished because its failure to follow Europe in advancing along a series of singled-out stages of development (based on the model provided in a higher place all past France and Britain), which were assumed to be uniformly applicable to all societies. Historians seeking to identify the factors which prevented the Ottomans from achieving "modernization" turned to the stereotypes which formed the basis of the decline thesis: an Ottoman penchant for despotism and lethargy which inhibited their entry into the modern world and brought well-nigh economic stagnation.[67] Dependency theory, in dissimilarity, viewed modern-solar day underdevelopment every bit the production of the diff global economic system gradually established by Europeans beginning in the early on mod period, and thus saw it as the event of a historical process rather than a simple inability to accommodate on the part of the non-Western world.[68] Dependency theory, introduced into Ottoman history past Huri İslamoğlu-İnan and Çağlar Keyder, thus allowed historians to motility beyond the concepts which had previously dominated Ottoman economic history, above all the notion of an "Oriental despotism"[northward 1] which supposedly inhibited economical development, and instead to examine the empire in terms of its gradual integration into the periphery of a newly emerging Europe-centered globe organisation. Subsequent provincial studies highlighted the degree to which the eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire was undergoing its ain capitalist transformation independent of European economic penetration, which in turn facilitated the empire's integration into the earth economy.[seventy] Even post-obit the empire's peripheralization, Ottoman manufacturing, long assumed to accept collapsed in the face of European competition, is now understood to take grown and even flourished during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, benefiting from the forcefulness of the Ottoman domestic market.[71]

In earlier periods, Ottoman economical and fiscal downturn was associated above all with the catastrophic effects of the price revolution of the late sixteenth century. However, this economic downturn was not unique to the Ottomans, only was shared past European states equally all struggled with the diverse pressures of aggrandizement, demographic shifts, and the escalating costs of warfare. By placing the Ottomans in comparative context with their neighbors, scholars take demonstrated that the multiple crises experienced by the Ottomans in the late sixteenth and early on-to-mid seventeenth centuries tin can be seen as part of a wider European context characterized every bit the 'general crisis of the seventeenth century', rather than a sign of uniquely Ottoman decline.[72] The supposition that the Ottoman economic system was unable to recover from these crises was rooted both in the poor land of the field'due south cognition of the Ottoman economic system in the later on seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and likewise in how easily information technology seemed to fit with pre-existing ideas nearly Ottoman decline.[73] All the same, subsequent enquiry demonstrated that, in the words of Şevket Pamuk, the eighteenth century "was in fact a menses of recovery for the Ottoman budgetary system," indicating that "the old thesis of continuous turn down cannot be sustained."[74] Far from declining, the showtime half of the eighteenth century was a menstruation of significant expansion and growth for the Ottoman economy.[75]

Other supposed manifestations of Ottoman economic decline have also been challenged. The institution by European merchants of new maritime merchandise routes to India around the Greatcoat of Good Promise, bypassing Ottoman territories, had a far less pregnant bear upon on the Ottoman economy than had once been assumed. While earlier scholarship depicted the Portuguese every bit having established a nigh-monopoly on the motion of luxury goods, particularly spices, to Europe, in fact the Portuguese were merely 1 of many actors competing in the Indian Ocean commercial arena. Fifty-fifty in the belatedly sixteenth century, Asian merchants utilizing the traditional Ruby Bounding main merchandise routes through Ottoman territory transported iv times as many spices as those of Portuguese merchants,[76] and until the early on eighteenth century more silver specie continued to be imported into India via the traditional Middle Eastern routes than through the European-dominated Cape road.[77] The loss of acquirement which did occur was made up for past the rise in the coffee merchandise from Yemen during the seventeenth century which, along with strong commercial ties with India, ensured the continued prosperity of Red Sea trade and of Cairo every bit a commercial center.[78]

Historians such equally the above-mentioned Bernard Lewis once referred to the supposed fall in the quality of the empire's bureaucratic records as an indication of stagnation in the Ottoman authoritative apparatus.[79] Historians now recognize that no such pass up ever occurred.[lxxx] This modify in record-keeping was attributable not to loss in quality, just to a change in the nature of state assessment, as the empire adjusted to the increasingly monetized economy characteristic of the seventeenth century. The assessment methods in employ under Sultan Suleiman were well-suited to ensuring proper distribution of revenues to the army of feudal cavalry that then made upwardly the majority of Ottoman forces. However, by the turn of the century, the demand for cash to enhance armies of musket-wielding infantry led the central regime to reform its system of land tenure, and to expand the practice of tax farming, which was also a common method of revenue-raising in contemporary Europe. In fact, the seventeenth century was a menstruum of significant expansion in the Ottoman bureaucracy, not contraction or decline.[81] [82] [83] These changes, reverse to the claims of earlier historians, practise non seem to have led to widespread abuse or oppression to a degree greater than that observable among the Ottoman Empire's European contemporaries.[84] The Ottomans, like other European states, struggled throughout the seventeenth century to come across apace ascension expenses, only past its finish were able to plant reforms which allowed them to enter the eighteenth century with a upkeep surplus. In the words of Linda Darling, "Ascribing seventeenth-century Ottoman budgetary deficits to the decline of the empire leaves unexplained the cessation of these deficits in the eighteenth century."[85]

21st-century scholarly consensus [edit]

Having dispensed with the notion of refuse, today'south historians of the Ottoman Empire well-nigh commonly refer to the postal service-Suleimanic Period, or more widely the catamenia from 1550 to 1700, equally one of transformation.[86] [87] The role of economic and political crises in defining this period is crucial, but so too is their temporary nature, as the Ottoman state was ultimately able to survive and adapt to a changing globe.[88] [89] Besides of increasing emphasis is the place of the Ottoman Empire in comparative perspective, particularly with u.s. of Europe. While the Ottomans struggled with a severe economic and fiscal downturn, and so too did their European contemporaries. This menstruation is oftentimes referred to as that of The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century,[90] and thus the difficulties faced past the Ottoman Empire have been reframed non as unique to them, but every bit part of a full general tendency impacting the entire European and Mediterranean region.[91] [92] In the words of Ehud Toledano, "In both Europe and the Ottoman empire, these changes transformed states and the ways in which military machine-authoritative elites waged and funded wars. Coping with these enormous challenges and finding the advisable responses through a sea of socio-economical and political changes is, in fact, the story of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Ottoman history. A remarkable adaptation to new realities, rather than decline and disintegration, was its principal feature; it reflects the resourcefulness, pragmatism and flexibility in thought and activity of the Ottoman military-administrative aristocracy, rather than their ineptitude or incompetence.[93] Thus, per Dana Sajdi: "Regardless of what one may think of an private revisionist work, or a particular method or framework, the cumulative upshot of the scholarship has demonstrated the empirical and theoretical invalidity of the reject thesis, and offered a portrayal of an internally dynamic Ottoman state and social club. It has as well established the comparability of the Ottoman empire to other - mainly European - societies and polities, and concomitantly revised the existing scheme of periodization."[94] The 21st-century scholarly consensus on the post-Suleimanic menstruation can thus be summarized as follows:

Historians of the Ottoman Empire accept rejected the narrative of decline in favor of one of crisis and accommodation: after weathering a wretched economic and demographic crisis in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, the Ottoman Empire adjusted its character from that of a military conquest country to that of a territorially more stable, bureaucratic state whose chief concern was no longer conquering new territories but extracting acquirement from the territories it already controlled while shoring upwards its image equally the breastwork of Sunni Islam.

—Jane Hathaway, with contributions by Karl Thou. Barbir, The Arab Lands Under Ottoman Rule, 1516–1800, (Pearson Education Limited, 2008), pp. viii–9.

See also [edit]

  • Gaza Thesis
  • Renegade thesis

Notes [edit]

  1. ^ "Oriental despotism" was a term deployed in Marxist historical analyses. It was postulated on a vision of Eye Eastern state and society every bit one in which all power was concentrated in the hands of an absolute ruler, who by decision-making all of the country in the empire, prevented the independent emergence of a native bourgeoisie, and thus made commercialism incommunicable. This concept, or others like information technology, long served as a foundational principle in the study of the economic history of the Ottoman Empire and of Asian societies more generally, though it was, as noted past Zachary Lockman, "in reality based on crude generalizations and a very faulty understanding of their [Asian societies'] (quite diverse) histories and social structures.[69]

References [edit]

  1. ^ a b Hathaway, Jane (2008). The Arab Lands under Ottoman Dominion, 1516–1800. Pearson Education Ltd. pp. seven–eight. ISBN978-0-582-41899-8. Ane of the most momentous changes to accept occurred in Ottoman studies since the publication of Egypt and the Fertile Crescent [1966] is the deconstruction of the then-called 'Ottoman turn down thesis' – that is, the notion that toward the finish of the sixteenth century, following the reign of Sultan Suleyman I (1520–66), the empire entered a lengthy decline from which it never truly recovered, despite heroic attempts at westernizing reforms in the nineteenth century. Over the final twenty years or so, as Chapter 4 will signal out, historians of the Ottoman Empire take rejected the narrative of pass up in favour of one of crisis and adaptation
    • Kunt, Metin (1995). "Introduction to Office I". In Kunt, Metin; Christine Woodhead (eds.). Süleyman the Magnificent and His Age: the Ottoman Empire in the Early Modern World. London and New York: Longman. pp. 37–38. students of Ottoman history accept learned better than to discuss a "refuse" which supposedly began during the reigns of Süleyman'southward "ineffectual" successors and and so continued for centuries.
    • Tezcan, Baki (2010). The Second Ottoman Empire: Political and Social Transformation in the Early Modern Menstruation. Cambridge University Press. p. 9. ISBN978-ane-107-41144-9. Ottomanist historians have produced several works in the last decades, revising the traditional agreement of this menstruum from various angles, some of which were not even considered as topics of historical inquiry in the mid-twentieth century. Thanks to these works, the conventional narrative of Ottoman history – that in the belatedly sixteenth century the Ottoman Empire entered a prolonged period of turn down marked by steadily increasing military machine decay and institutional abuse – has been discarded.
    • Woodhead, Christine (2011). "Introduction". In Christine Woodhead (ed.). The Ottoman World. p. 5. ISBN978-0-415-44492-vii. Ottomanist historians have largely jettisoned the notion of a post-1600 'turn down'
    • Ehud Toledano (2011). "The Arabic-speaking globe in the Ottoman period: A socio-political analysis". In Woodhead, Christine (ed.). The Ottoman Globe. Routledge. p. 457. ISBN978-0-415-44492-7. In the scholarly literature produced by Ottomanists since the mid-1970s, the hitherto prevailing view of Ottoman reject has been finer debunked.
    • Leslie Peirce, "Changing Perceptions of the Ottoman Empire: the Early Centuries," Mediterranean Historical Review 19/ane (2004): 22.
    • Cemal Kafadar, "The Question of Ottoman Decline," Harvard Middle Eastern and Islamic Review 4/i–two (1997–98), pp. thirty–75.
    • Chiliad. Fatih Çalışır, "Decline of a 'Myth': Perspectives on the Ottoman 'Decline'," The History Schoolhouse 9 (2011): 37–60.
    • Donald Quataert, "Ottoman History Writing and Changing Attitudes towards the Notion of 'Decline,'" History Compass ane (2003)
  2. ^ Linda Darling, Acquirement Raising and Legitimacy: Tax Collection and Finance Administration in the Ottoman Empire, 1560–1660 (Leiden: Due east.J. Brill, 1996), [1].
    • Günhan Börekçi, "Factions and Favorites at the Courts of Sultan Ahmed I (r. 1603–1617) and His Immediate Predecessors," PhD dissertation (The Ohio State University, 2010), five.
  3. ^ Suraiya Faroqhi, The Ottoman Empire and the World Effectually It (I. B. Tauris, 2004; 2011), pp. 42–43.
    • Virginia Aksan, "Ottoman to Turk: Continuity and Alter," International Periodical 61 (Winter 2005/half dozen): 19–38.
  4. ^ Howard, Douglas A. "Genre and myth in the Ottoman advice for kings literature," in Aksan, Virginia H. and Daniel Goffman eds. The Early Modern Ottomans: Remapping the Empire (Cambridge University Press, 2007; 2009), 143.
  5. ^ Darling, Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy, four.
    • Abou-El-Haj, Formation of the Modern State, pp. three–4.
    • Karen Barkey, Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization, (Cornell University Press, 1994), 9.
  6. ^ Finkel, Caroline (1988). The Administration of Warfare: The Ottoman Military Campaigns in Hungary, 1593–1606. Vienna: VWGÖ. p. 143. ISBN3-85369-708-9.
  7. ^ Kunt, Metin (1995). "Introduction to Part I". In Kunt, Metin; Christine Woodhead (eds.). Süleyman the Magnificent and His Age: the Ottoman Empire in the Early on Modern Earth. London and New York: Longman. pp. 37–38. students of Ottoman history have learned improve than to hash out a "pass up" which supposedly began during the reigns of Süleyman's "ineffectual" successors and and then continued for centuries.
  8. ^ Ehud Toledano (2011). "The Arabic-speaking earth in the Ottoman period: A socio-political analysis". In Woodhead, Christine (ed.). The Ottoman World. Routledge. p. 457. ISBN978-0-415-44492-vii. In the scholarly literature produced past Ottomanists since the mid-1970s, the hitherto prevailing view of Ottoman decline has been effectively debunked. However, only likewise often, the results of painstaking research and innovative revisions offered in that literature take non yet percolated down to scholars working outside Ottoman studies. Historians in adjacent fields have tended to rely on earlier classics and later uninformed surveys which perpetuate older, now deconstructed, views.
  9. ^ Dana Sajdi refers on the one paw to nationalists in post-Ottoman regions of the world, and on the other, to the supporters of imperialistic intervention in the Middle Due east among some politicians in the West. Sajdi, Dana (2007). "Decline, its Discontents, and Ottoman Cultural History: By Style of Introduction". In Sajdi, Dana (ed.). Ottoman Tulips, Ottoman Coffee: Leisure and Lifestyle in the Eighteenth Century. London: I.B. Taurus. pp. 38–ix.
  10. ^ Darling, Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy, iii.
  11. ^ Howard, "Genre and Myth," pp. 137–139.
  12. ^ Darling, Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy, pp. 283–84.
  13. ^ Cornell Fleischer. Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire: The Historian Mustafa Âli, 1541–1600, (Princeton: Princeton Academy Printing, 1986).
  14. ^ Fleischer, Bureaucrat and Intellectual, 103.
  15. ^ Douglas Howard, "Ottoman Historiography and the Literature of 'Decline' of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century," Journal of Asian History 22 (1988), pp. 52–77.
  16. ^ Abou-El-Haj, Formation of the Mod Country, pp. 20–forty.
  17. ^ "Historians of the Ottoman Empire (Chicago Academy)". September 2008. Retrieved 17 Jan 2021.
  18. ^ Cantemir, Dimitrie (1734). The history of the growth and decay of the Othman empire.
  19. ^ Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall, Geschichte des Osmanisches Reiches, (in German language) ten vols. (Budapest: Ca. H. Hartleben, 1827–35).
  20. ^ Darling, Acquirement-Raising and Legitimacy, pp. 3–4.
  21. ^ Lockman, Zachary (2010). Contending Visions of the Middle Due east: The History and Politics of Orientalism (2 ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge Academy Press. pp. 62–3.
  22. ^ Lockman, Zachary (2010). Contending Visions of the Middle East: The History and Politics of Orientalism (ii ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge Academy Press. pp. 104–12, 130–3.
  23. ^ Howard, "Ottoman Advice for Kings," pp. 143–44; Edward Said, Orientalism, (New York: Pantheon, 1978).
  24. ^ Darling, Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy, 2.
  25. ^ Bernard Lewis, "Some Reflections on the Decline of the Ottoman Empire", Studia Islamica i (1958) 111–127.
  26. ^ Tezcan, Second Ottoman Empire, 242n.
    • Hathaway, "Problems of Periodization"
    • Darling, "Another Wait at Periodization"
    • Quataert, "Ottoman History Writing"
    • Suraiya Faroqhi, Approaching Ottoman History: An Introduction to the Sources, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Printing, 1999) 180.
  27. ^ Lewis, "Some Reflections", pp. 112–127.
  28. ^ Sajdi, Dana (2007). "Turn down, its Discontents, and Ottoman Cultural History: By Way of Introduction". In Sajdi, Dana (ed.). Ottoman Tulips, Ottoman Coffee: Leisure and Lifestyle in the Eighteenth Century. London: I.B. Taurus. pp. 4–half dozen.
  29. ^ Sajdi, Dana (2007). "Decline, its Discontents, and Ottoman Cultural History: By Way of Introduction". In Sajdi, Dana (ed.). Ottoman Tulips, Ottoman Coffee: Leisure and Lifestyle in the Eighteenth Century. London: I.B. Taurus. p. 6.
  30. ^ Sajdi, Dana (2007). "Pass up, its Discontents, and Ottoman Cultural History: By Mode of Introduction". In Sajdi, Dana (ed.). Ottoman Tulips, Ottoman Java: Leisure and Lifestyle in the Eighteenth Century. London: I.B. Taurus. p. 5.
  31. ^ Darling, Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy, pp. 4–v.
  32. ^ a b Hathaway, "Problems of Periodization," 26.
  33. ^ Ehud Toledano (2011). "The Arabic-speaking world in the Ottoman period: A socio-political analysis". In Woodhead, Christine (ed.). The Ottoman Globe. Routledge. p. 457. ISBN978-0-415-44492-seven.
  34. ^ Douglas Howard, "Ottoman Historiography," pp. 52–77.
  35. ^ Abou-El-Haj, Formation of the Modern Country, pp. 23–26.
  36. ^ Cemal Kafadar, "The Myth of the Golden Age: Ottoman Historical Consciousness in the mail-Süleymanic Era," in Süleyman the 2nd [sic] and His Fourth dimension, eds. Halil İnalcık and Cemal Kafadar (Istanbul: ISIS Printing, 1993), pp. 44.
  37. ^ Rhoads Murphey, "The Veliyüddin Telhis: Notes on the Sources and Interrelations between Koçu Bey and Contemporary Writers of Advice to Kings," Belleten 43 (1979), pp. 547–571.
  38. ^ Pál Fodor, "State and Society, Crisis and Reform, in a 15th–17th Century Ottoman Mirror for Princes," Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae 40 (1986), pp. 217–240.
  39. ^ Metin Kunt, "Introduction to Part I," 37–38.
  40. ^ Börekçi, "Factions and Favorites."
  41. ^ Tezcan, Second Ottoman Empire.
  42. ^ Marc Baer, Honored by the Glory of Islam: Conversion and Conquest in Ottoman Europe, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008)
  43. ^ Kafadar, "The Myth of the Gilded Historic period", 37–48.
  44. ^ Kaya Şahin, Empire and Ability in the Reign of Süleyman: Narrating the Sixteenth-Century Ottoman World, (Cambridge: Cambridge Academy Printing, 2013)
  45. ^ Hakan T. Karateke, "On the Tranquility and Tranquillity of the Sultan," in Christine Woodhead eds. The Ottoman Earth, (Routledge, 2011), 116.
    • Leslie Peirce, The Purple Harem: Women and Sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire, (Oxford University Press: 1993), 185.
  46. ^ Peirce, The Purple Harem, pp. 267–285.
  47. ^ Darling, Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy, pp. 200–306.
  48. ^ Hathaway, The Arab Lands, 9
  49. ^ Donald Quataert, "Ottoman History Writing", 5.
  50. ^ Salzmann, Ariel (1993). "An Ancien Régime Revisited: "Privatization" and Political Economy in the Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Empire". Politics & Society. 21 (iv): 393–423. doi:10.1177/0032329293021004003.
  51. ^ Cemal Kafadar, "On the Purity and Abuse of the Janissaries," Turkish Studies Clan Bulletin 15 (1991): 273–280.
  52. ^ Günhan Börekçi, "A Contribution to the Armed services Revolution Debate: The Janissaries' Use of Volley Burn During the Long Ottoman-Habsburg War of 1593–1606 and the Trouble of Origins." Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae 59 (2006): 407–438.
  53. ^ Tezcan, 2d Ottoman Empire, pp. 22–23.
  54. ^ Metin Kunt, The Sultan's Servants: The Transformation of Ottoman Provincial Regime, 1550–1650, (New York: Columbia University Printing, 1983) 98.
  55. ^ Ariel Salzmann, "The Former Regime and the Ottoman Middle East," in Christine Woodhead eds. The Ottoman World, (Routledge, 2011), 412.
  56. ^ Halil İnalcık, "Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600–1700," Archivum Ottomanicum 6 (1980): 283–337.
  57. ^ Gábor Ágoston, "Firearms and Military Adaptation: The Ottomans and the European Military Revolution, 1450–1800". Journal of Globe History.' 25 (2014): 123.
  58. ^ Jonathan Grant, "Rethinking the Ottoman "Decline": Military Technology Diffusion in the Ottoman Empire, Fifteenth to Eighteenth Centuries." Journal of World History 10 (1999): 179–201.
  59. ^ Gábor Ágoston, "Ottoman Artillery and European Military Technology in the Fifteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae 47/1–ii (1994): xv–48.
  60. ^ Gábor Ágoston, Guns for the Sultan: Military Power and the Weapons Industry in the Ottoman Empire, (Cambridge: Cambridge Academy Press, 2005) pp. 195–98.
  61. ^ Ágoston, "Armed services Transformation," pp. 286–87.
  62. ^ Ágoston, Guns for the Sultan, pp. 192–195.
  63. ^ Ágoston, Guns for the Sultan, pp. 199–200.
  64. ^ Ágoston, Guns for the Sultan, pp. 200–201.
  65. ^ Rhoads Murphey, Ottoman Warfare: 1500–1700, (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1999), 10.
  66. ^ Aksan, Virginia (2007). Ottoman Wars, 1700–1860: An Empire Besieged. Pearson Education Ltd. pp. 130–5. ISBN978-0-582-30807-7.
    • Woodhead, Christine (2008). "New Views on Ottoman History, 1453–1839". The English Historical Review. Oxford University Press. 123: 983. the Ottomans were able largely to maintain military parity until taken by surprise both on land and at sea in the Russian war from 1768 to 1774.
  67. ^ Quataert, Donald (2003). "Ottoman History Writing and Irresolute Attitudes towards the Notion of 'Decline'". History Compass. 1: ii. doi:ten.1111/1478-0542.038.
  68. ^ Lockman, Zachary (2010). Contending Visions of the Middle East: The History and Politics of Orientalism (2 ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge Academy Press. pp. 155–nine, 169–70.
  69. ^ Lockman, Zachary (2010). Contending Visions of the Middle Due east: The History and Politics of Orientalism (2 ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 83–5.
  70. ^ Sajdi, Dana (2007). "Decline, its Discontents, and Ottoman Cultural History: By Way of Introduction". In Sajdi, Dana (ed.). Ottoman Tulips, Ottoman Coffee: Leisure and Lifestyle in the Eighteenth Century. London: I.B. Taurus. pp. 12–4.
  71. ^ Quataert, Donald (2003). "Ottoman History Writing and Irresolute Attitudes towards the Notion of 'Decline'". History Compass. one: 5–6. doi:10.1111/1478-0542.038.
  72. ^ Sajdi, Dana (2007). "Refuse, its Discontents, and Ottoman Cultural History: Past Manner of Introduction". In Sajdi, Dana (ed.). Ottoman Tulips, Ottoman Coffee: Leisure and Lifestyle in the Eighteenth Century. London: I.B. Taurus. p. 15.
  73. ^ Quataert, Donald (2003). "Ottoman History Writing and Changing Attitudes towards the Notion of 'Turn down'". History Compass. 1: five. doi:10.1111/1478-0542.038.
  74. ^ Pamuk, Şevket (2000). A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. xx.
  75. ^ Salzmann, Ariel (1993). "An Ancien Régime Revisited: "Privatization" and Political Economic system in the Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Empire". Politics & Social club. 21 (4): 402. doi:x.1177/0032329293021004003.
    • Pamuk, Şevket (2003). "Crisis and Recovery: The Ottoman Monetary System in the Early Modern Era, 1550-1789". In Dennis O. Flynn; Arturo Giráldez; Richard von Glahn (eds.). Global Connections and Budgetary History, 1470-1800. Aldershot: Ashgate. p. 140. the eighteenth century until the 1780s was a menses of commercial and economic expansion coupled with fiscal stability.
  76. ^ Levi, Scott C. (2014). "Objects in Motion". In Douglas Northrop (ed.). A Companion to Earth History. Wiley Blackwell. p. 331.
  77. ^ Prakash, Om (2003). "Precious-metallic Flows into Bharat in the Early on Modern Period". In Dennis O. Flynn; Arturo Giráldez; Richard von Glahn (eds.). Global Connections and Monetary History, 1470-1800. Aldershot: Ashgate. p. 154.
  78. ^ Faroqhi, "Crisis and Change," 507; Jane Hathaway, "The Ottomans and the Yemeni Coffee Trade," Oriente Moderno 25 (2006): 161–171.
  79. ^ Lewis, "Some Reflections," 113.
  80. ^ Darling, Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy, pp. 299–306.
  81. ^ Darling, Acquirement-Raising and Legitimacy, pp. 81–118.
  82. ^ Michael Ursinus, "The Transformation of the Ottoman Fiscal Regime, c. 1600–1850," in Christine Woodhead eds. The Ottoman World, (Routledge, 2011) 423–434.
  83. ^ Tezcan, 2d Ottoman Empire, pp. nineteen–23.
  84. ^ Darling, Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy, pp. 246–eighty.
  85. ^ Darling, Acquirement-Raising and Legitimacy, 239.
  86. ^ Faroqhi, Crisis and Modify, 553.
  87. ^ Carter Vaughn Findley, "Political culture and the slap-up households", in Suraiya Faroqhi eds., The Later Ottoman Empire, 1603–1839, volume iii of The Cambridge History of Turkey. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Printing, 2006), 66.
  88. ^ Hathaway, Arab Lands, 59.
  89. ^ Faroqhi, "Crisis and Change," 411–414.
  90. ^ Geoffrey Parker, Global Crisis: State of war, Climate change & Ending in the Seventeenth Century, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013)
  91. ^ Darling, Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy, pp. viii–ten.
  92. ^ Ursinus, "The Transformation of the Ottoman Fiscal Government," 423.
  93. ^ Ehud Toledano (2011). "The Arabic-speaking earth in the Ottoman period: A socio-political analysis". In Woodhead, Christine (ed.). The Ottoman World. Routledge. p. 459. ISBN978-0-415-44492-7.
  94. ^ Sajdi, Dana (2007). "Decline, its Discontents, and Ottoman Cultural History: By Manner of Introduction". In Sajdi, Dana (ed.). Ottoman Tulips, Ottoman Java: Leisure and Lifestyle in the Eighteenth Century. London: I.B. Taurus. p. 27.

Bibliography [edit]

  • Abou-El-Haj, Rifa'at A. Formation of the Mod State: The Ottoman Empire, Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries. 2nd ed. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2005.
  • Abou-El-Haj, Rifa'at A. "The Ottoman Vezir and Paşa Households 1683–1703, A Preliminary Report." Journal of the American Oriental Lodge 94 (1974): 438–447.
  • Ágoston, Gábor. "Firearms and Military Accommodation: The Ottomans and the European Armed services Revolution, 1450–1800". Journal of World History.' 25 (2014): 85–124.
  • Ágoston, Gábor. Guns for the Sultan: Armed forces Power and the Weapons Manufacture in the Ottoman Empire. Cambridge: Cambridge Academy Press, 2005.
  • Ágoston, Gábor. "Ottoman Artillery and European Military Engineering science in the Fifteenth and Seventeenth Centuries." Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae 47/1–2 (1994): fifteen–48.
  • Aksan, Virginia and Daniel Goffman eds. The Early Modern Ottomans: Remapping the Empire. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
  • Aksan, Virginia. "Ottoman to Turk: Continuity and Change." International Journal 61 (Wintertime 2005/6): 19–38.
  • Aksan, Virginia (2007). Ottoman Wars, 1700–1860: An Empire Besieged. Pearson Education Ltd. pp. 130–5. ISBN978-0-582-30807-7.
  • Aksan, Virginia. "Theoretical Ottomans." History and Theory 47 (2008): 109–122.
  • Baer, Marc. Honored by the Glory of Islam: Conversion and Conquest in Ottoman Europe. New York: Oxford University Printing, 2008.
  • Barkey, Karen. Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization. Cornell University Press, 1994.
  • Börekçi, Günhan. "A Contribution to the Military machine Revolution Debate: The Janissaries' Use of Volley Fire During the Long Ottoman-Habsburg War of 1593–1606 and the Problem of Origins." Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae 59 (2006): 407–438.
  • Börekçi, Günhan. "Factions and Favorites at the Courts of Sultan Ahmed I (r. 1603–17) and His Immediate Predecessors." PhD dissertation. The Ohio State Academy, 2010.
  • Çalışır, M. Fatih. "Decline of a 'Myth': Perspectives on the Ottoman 'Decline'," The History Schoolhouse 9 (2011): 37–lx.
  • Casale, Giancarlo, The Ottoman Age of Exploration. Oxford University Press, 2010.
  • Darling, Linda. Acquirement Raising and Legitimacy: Revenue enhancement Drove and Finance Administration in the Ottoman Empire, 1560–1660. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1996.
  • Faroqhi, Suraiya. Budgeted Ottoman History: An Introduction to the Sources. Cambridge: Cambridge Academy Press, 1999.
  • Faroqhi, Suraiya, eds. The Later on Ottoman Empire, 1603–1839, volume 3 of The Cambridge History of Turkey. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
  • Faroqhi, Suraiya. "Crisis and Change, 1590–1699." In An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300–1914, 411–636. Edited by Halil İnalcık with Donald Quataert. Cambridge: Cambridge Academy Press, 1994.
  • Faroqhi, Suraiya. The Ottoman Empire and the Globe Around It. I. B. Tauris, 2004; 2011.
  • Findley, Carter Vaughn. "Political civilisation and the swell households", in Suraiya Faroqhi eds., The After Ottoman Empire, 1603–1839 (2006).
  • Finkel, Caroline (1988). The Administration of Warfare: The Ottoman Military machine Campaigns in Hungary, 1593–1606. Vienna: VWGÖ. ISBNthree-85369-708-9.
  • Fleischer, Cornell. Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire: The Historian Mustafa Âli, 1541–1600. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986.
  • Fodor, Pál. "Land and Guild, Crisis and Reform, in a 15th–17th Century Ottoman Mirror for Princes." Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae 40 (1986): 217–240.
  • Gibb, H.A.R. and Harold Bowen. Islamic Society and the West: A Study of the Impact of Western Culture on Modern Culture in the Most Due east. Oxford: Oxford University Printing, 1950, 1957.
  • Grant, Jonathan. "Rethinking the Ottoman 'Pass up': Military Applied science Improvidence in the Ottoman Empire, Fifteenth to Eighteenth Centuries." Journal of World History 10 (1999): 179–201.
  • Hammer-Purgstall, Joseph von. Geschichte des Osmanisches Reiches. (in German) 10 vols. Budapest: Ca. H. Hartleben, 1827–35.
  • Hathaway, Jane. The Arab Lands nether Ottoman Rule, 1516–1800, with contributions by Karl K. Barbir. Pearson Education Limited, 2008.
  • Hathaway, Jane. "The Ottomans and the Yemeni Java Trade." Oriente Moderno 25 (2006): 161–171.
  • Hathaway, Jane. The Politics of Households in Ottoman Arab republic of egypt: The Rise of the Qazdağlıs. Cambridge University Printing, 1997.
  • Hathaway, Jane. "Bug of Periodization in Ottoman History: The Fifteenth through the Eighteenth Centuries". The Turkish Studies Association Bulletin twenty (1996): 25–31.
  • Howard, Douglas. "Genre and Myth in the Ottoman Advice for Kings Literature." In The Early Modern Ottomans: Remapping the Empire. Edited by Virginia Aksan and Daniel Goffman. Cambridge: Cambridge Academy Press, 2007.
  • Howard, Douglas. "Ottoman Historiography and the Literature of 'Reject' of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century." Periodical of Asian History 22 (1988): 52–77.
  • İnalcık, Halil ed., with Donald Quataert. An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300–1914. Cambridge: Cambridge University Printing, 1994.
  • İnalcık, Halil. "Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600–1700." Archivum Ottomanicum half-dozen (1980): 283–337.
  • İnalcık, Halil and Cemal Kafadar eds., Süleyman the Second [sic] and His Time. Istanbul: ISIS Press, 1993.
  • Kafadar, Cemal. "The Myth of the Gold Age: Ottoman Historical Consciousness in the post-Süleymanic Era." 37–48. In Süleyman the 2d [sic] and His Time. Edited by Halil İnalcık and Cemal Kafadar. Istanbul: ISIS Press, 1993.
  • Kafadar, Cemal. "On the Purity and Abuse of the Janissaries," Turkish Studies Association Bulletin 15 (1991): 273–280.
  • Karateke, Hakan T. "On the Tranquility and Repose of the Sultan," In The Ottoman World, 116–129. Edited by Christine Woodhead. Routledge, 2011.
  • Kunt, Metin. "Introduction to Part I," in Süleyman the Magnificent and His Historic period: the Ottoman Empire in the Early Mod Earth. Edited by Metin Kunt and Christine Woodhead. London and New York: Longman, 1995.
  • Kunt, Metin. "Royal and Other Households," in The Ottoman Earth. Edited by Christine Woodhead. Routledge, 2011.
  • Kunt, Metin. The Sultan's Servants: The Transformation of Ottoman Provincial Government, 1550–1650. The Modern Middle E Series, 14. New York: Columbia University Press, 1983.
  • Lewis, Bernard. "Some Reflections on the Decline of the Ottoman Empire." Studia Islamica one (1958): 111–127.
  • Masters, Bruce. The Origins of Western Economic Dominance in the Eye East: Mercantilism and the Islamic Economic system in Aleppo, 1600–1750. New York and London: New York University Printing, 1988.
  • Murphey, Rhoads. Ottoman Warfare: 1500–1700. New Brunswick: Rutgers Academy Press, 1999.
  • Murphey, Rhoads. "The Veliyüddin Telhis: Notes on the Sources and Interrelations between Koçu Bey and Contemporary Writers of Advice to Kings." Belleten 43 (1979): 547–571.
  • Pamuk, Şevket. A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
  • Parker, Geoffrey. Global Crisis: War, Climatic change & Catastrophe in the Seventeenth Century. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013.
  • Peirce, Leslie. "Changing Perceptions of the Ottoman Empire: the Early Centuries." Mediterranean Historical Review 19/one (2004): 6–28.
  • Peirce, Leslie. The Regal Harem: Women and Sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire. Oxford University Press: 1993.
  • Quataert, Donald. "Ottoman History Writing and Changing Attitudes towards the Notion of 'Decline,'" History Compass i (2003)
  • Şahin, Kaya. Empire and Power in the Reign of Süleyman: Narrating the Sixteenth-Century Ottoman World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Printing, 2013.
  • Said, Edward. Orientalism. New York: Pantheon, 1978.
  • Salzmann, Ariel. "The Old Regime and the Ottoman Centre Eastward." In The Ottoman World, 409–422. Edited past Christine Woodhead. Routledge, 2011.
  • Salzmann, Ariel (1993). "An Ancien Régime Revisited: "Privatization" and Political Economy in the Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Empire". Politics & Social club. 21 (4): 393–423. doi:x.1177/0032329293021004003.
  • Tezcan, Baki. The Second Ottoman Empire: Political and Social Transformation in the Early Modern Globe. Cambridge University Printing, 2010.
  • Ehud Toledano (2011). "The Arabic-speaking earth in the Ottoman catamenia: A socio-political analysis". In Woodhead, Christine (ed.). The Ottoman Globe. Routledge. pp. 453–66. ISBN978-0-415-44492-7.
  • Ursinus, Michael. "The Transformation of the Ottoman Fiscal Regime, c. 1600–1850." In The Ottoman World, 423–435. Edited by Christine Woodhead. Routledge, 2011.
  • Woodhead, Christine eds. The Ottoman World. Routledge, 2011.
  • Woodhead, Christine (2008). "New Views on Ottoman History, 1453–1839". The English Historical Review. Oxford Academy Press. 123: 973–987. doi:x.1093/ehr/cen174.

Farther reading [edit]

The post-obit is a list of several works which have been peculiarly influential in overturning the turn down thesis.

  • Abou-El-Haj, Rifa'at A. Formation of the Modern Land: The Ottoman Empire, Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries. 2nd ed. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2005. [Showtime edition published in 1991]
  • Barkey, Karen. Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization. Cornell University Press, 1994.
  • Darling, Linda. Revenue Raising and Legitimacy: Taxation Collection and Finance Administration in the Ottoman Empire, 1560–1660. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1996.
  • Fleischer, Cornell. Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire: The Historian Mustafa Âli, 1541–1600. Princeton: Princeton Academy Press, 1986.
  • Hathaway, Jane. "Problems of Periodization in Ottoman History: The Fifteenth through the Eighteenth Centuries". The Turkish Studies Association Bulletin 20 (1996): 25–31.
  • Howard, Douglas. "Ottoman Historiography and the Literature of 'Pass up' of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century." Journal of Asian History 22 (1988): 52–77.
  • İnalcık, Halil. "Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600–1700." Archivum Ottomanicum half dozen (1980): 283–337.
  • Kafadar, Cemal. "On the Purity and Corruption of the Janissaries," Turkish Studies Association Bulletin xv (1991): 273–280.
  • Kunt, Metin. The Sultan'south Servants: The Transformation of Ottoman Provincial Government, 1550–1650. The Modernistic Heart East Series, 14. New York: Columbia University Press, 1983.
  • Salzmann, Ariel. "An Ancien Régime Revisited: "Privatization" and Political Economy in the Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Empire." *Politics & Society* 21 (1993): 393–423.

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Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ottoman_Decline_Thesis

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